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Abstract 
 
In this paper we aim to understand if gender makes a difference in the path to promotion to 
full professor in Italian universities, drawing on data from 2013 to 2016. The new promotion 
system pursuant Gelmini Law (210/2010) in Italy implies to go through two steps. First, they 
have to obtain the national ASN system (fit-for-the-role national filter), based on merit 
measured via bibliometric and non-bibliometric indicators. This step does not mean to get a 
position, it only means to be able to apply for it at institutional level. We believe that 
discrimination based on gender may happen especially at institutional level as in comparison 
to ASN there is less transparency and more autonomy at institutional level. It is also 
hypothesised that discrimination based on gender may differ according to the percentage of 
women already at full professor rank by disciplinary field. We investigate gender inequality 
using a binary variable (promoted or not promoted along 2013 until 2016) controlling by 
scientific productivity, normalised number of available vacancies, result of national research 
evaluation (VQR – department of candidate’s affiliation), age, current rank-and-file position. 
Multilevel logistic regression demonstrates that among those who obtained the ASN and at 
parity of other conditions, men have around 24% more probability to be promoted at parity of 
scientific production, which reveals a relevant gender discrimination. Our findings have 
implications on theory about inequality regimes and might serve to reflect on how to improve 
practices at institutional level. 
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Introduction 
Underrepresentation of women in academic careers is a persistent problem, despite there is an 
overall parity in the number of women getting a postgraduate degree (EC, 2016). Women are 
less represented in some disciplinary areas, typically the ones related to hard sciences, 
technology, mathematics and engineering (Smith, 2011). Moreover, they are 
underrepresented in the middle and high ranks of academic careers (Morley, 2014). In this 
paper, we will focus on the second problem: the shortage of women in senior academic 
positions, which is investigated by focusing on the process of promotion to full professor in 
Italy. The objective is to understand if there are discriminations based on gender when it 
comes to appoint a full professor in a university. Focusing on this issue will allow shedding 
light on if, and to what extent, the new system might hinder women’s achievements in 
academia.  
The Italian case is interesting because of the intrinsic features of how the promotion system 
works. Since 2012, a new process has been introduced, based on two steps. First, academics 
are expected to go through the abilitazione scientifica nazionale (ASN), a national evaluation 
process aimed at awarding a fit-for-the-role qualification. Second, only candidates who 
successfully went through the ASN can apply to be promoted at a specific position. In the 
case of the rank of full professor, usually the promotion is achieved in the same university of 
affiliation at the time of getting the ASN.  
ASN occurs at the national level and is based on an analysis and evaluation of scientific 
outputs summarized in three indicators: number of journal papers, number of citations and H-
index for bibliometric disciplines; number of books, chapters and articles, and articles in “A-
class” journals for non-bibliometric disciplines. ASN is conducted by specific committees 
depending on the disciplinary field (settore concorsuale, SC): in total, there are 184 
committee disciplines, grouped in 14 areas (as listed in Table 1). Candidates applying to the 
rank of full professor are not necessarily associate professors.  
 
Table 1 around here 
 
ASN has been introduced to tackle issues of favouritism and nepotism as well (Abramo, 
D’Angelo, & Rosati, 2014); however, to some extent, these dynamics are still present 
(Abramo & D’Angelo, 2015a). Fresh literature shows that this new process is helping 
younger and productive candidates to progress quicker in their careers (Marini, 2016). 
However, this evidence is related to ASN, and not to actual promotions. Therefore, this paper 
may shed some light about the lamented long-standing problem of promotion awarded 
irrespectively of degree of productivity, promoting also research inactive scholars (Abramo, 
D’Angelo, & Soldatenkova, 2017). This problem of nepotism and lack of actual meritocracy 
is also at the base of an apparent missing bias against women in Italian universities: often, the 
foremost victims of unfair promotions are scholars who are more productive, which in turn 
are more frequently males (Abramo, D’Angelo, & Rosati, 2016). This study also suggests 
that women may apply less frequently for promotions, whereas to analyse ASN awarded 
should reduce this factor when checking for gender discriminations because a first selection 
based on voluntary application occurred. 
It is worth stressing that achieving the ASN does not mean to get the promotion or the 
recruitment to the respective rank of ASN; rather, it means to be eligible to it. Each university 
has full autonomy to promote anyone who got the ASN for the rank of full professor selecting 
from that pool, without any further national specification. Also, it is worth noting that the 
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number of candidates successfully going through the ASN is by far much higher than the 
number of available academic promotions. We believe that in this institutional process 
discriminations based on gender might occur, since universities are not strictly required to 
provide any transparent procedure as for the ASN process (Marzolla, 2016). In other terms, it 
is hypothesised that less transparency increases the possibilities of discrimination.  
In Italy, in 2013, the proportion of women full professors was 21.1%, slightly above the EU 
average of 20.9% (EC, 2016). Getting a position as a full professor is a matter of prestige and 
salary increase: it is possible that individuals, to get such a position, heavily rely on 
networking and other strategies that might interfere with building equality and diversity. Such 
strategies might be at odds with mere productivity indicators released with the ASN. Previous 
research conducted in the Netherlands has shown that the process of professorial recruitment 
is characterised by limited transparency and accountability, hence discriminations emerge 
(Van den Brink & Benschop, 2012a, 2014; Van den Brink, Benschop, & Jansen, 2010). 
Until now literature has especially focused on gender discrimination in ASN committees 
(Abramo, D’Angelo, & Rosati, 2015b; Manuel Bagues, Sylos-Labini, & Zinovyeva, 
forthcoming), but not on what happens once the ASN has been achieved, while this is 
especially relevant since obtaining the ASN does not mean to progress in one’s own career.  
In this paper, we draw on data about both ASN and actual promotions, from 2013 (when the 
evaluation of the first cohort of applicants to the ASN was concluded) to the end of 2016. We 
will focus on how many new full professor positions entered the system, analysing gender 
differences. The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section, we will give an 
overview of the background literature explaining the dynamics slowing down women’s 
academic careers. Afterwards, we will focus on the current literature explaining 
discriminations in the new ASN system in Italy. Objectives and methods follow. Discussion 
section aims at understanding the implications for both theory and practice. In the 
conclusions, we will reflect on the future possible developments out of this study. 
Women in academia: an uneasy career path 
Gender discrimination along academic careers has been widely documented: despite 
academic systems and promotion processes greatly vary among countries, there are some 
common issues. Literature shows that universities are “gendered organisations” (J. Acker, 
1990), created on the image of the disembodied worker, a (white and middle-class) man 
exclusively committed to his work; furthermore, higher education is built around a prestige 
economy, shaped on the male norm, being hence for women more difficult to break into it 
(Aiston & Jung, 2015; Coate & Howson, 2014; Fletcher, Boden, Kent, & Tinson, 2007). 
Empirical research demonstrates that, because of stereotyping and biases, more often women 
do not have the opportunity to have their voice listened to and contribute to important 
decision-making processes (Etzkowitz, Kemelgor, & Uzzi, 2000; Gherardi & Poggio, 2001; 
Rosser, 2004; Valian, 1999). Women’s contribution might be voluntarily hindered, and 
women might be criticized for futile reasons (Savigny, 2014). Unconscious gender bias might 
severely affect women career progression (Easterly & Ricard, 2011; Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, 
Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012; Roos & Gatta, 2009; Valian, 2005). Women might 
be disadvantaged when it comes to work allocation (Barrett & Barrett, 2011; Winslow, 2010): 
they are more often asked (or expected) to deal with tasks that are not central for their career 
progression (Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, & Weingart, 2017); teaching, pastoral care, or 
committee work, are exemplar (Coate & Howson, 2014; Guarino & Borden, 2017). Yet, 
women are highly underrepresented in senior management and high rank leadership positions 
in academia (Fuchs, von Stebut, & Allmendinger, 2001; Morley, 2013, 2014). 
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Academic work is renowned for requiring considerable time commitment (Sang, Powell, 
Finkel, & Richards, 2015): scholars argue that women might have their career chances 
compromised because, when compared to men, it is more likely that they have to devote their 
time to take care of others (S. Acker & Armenti, 2004; Bozzon, Murgia, Poggio, & Rapetti, 
2017; Lewis & Humbert, 2010; Rafnsdóttir & Heijstra, 2013; Toffoletti & Starr, 2016; 
Woodward, 2007). The issues of work-life balance and time constraints have been related to 
women’s lower scientific productivity (Aiston & Jung, 2015), hence to their 
underrepresentation at the professoriate level. However, evidence in relation to this is 
ambiguous: Stack (2004) and Sax (2002) reject that women produce less because of family-
related duties; Fox (2005) shows that the relations between parental and marital status and 
productivity are especially complex for women, and type of family composition and spouse 
occupation have an impact as well.  
When focusing on career progression and tenure, scholars have shown that the criteria of 
excellence and meritocracy are gendered at the detriment of women (Deem, 2009; Fassa & 
Kradolfer, 2013; Van den Brink & Benschop, 2012a; Van den Brink et al., 2010). Perna 
(2001), in her analysis of US data, shows that women are less likely to be appointed as 
professors, even when controlling for productivity, at 4-years Colleges. In a subsequent study, 
the author considers the impact of family ties, and shows that this does not explain the gap in 
becoming professor (Perna, 2005). Danell and Hjerm (2013), in their analysis of the careers 
of PhDs in Sweden between 1995 and 2010, show that women have 37% lower chance to 
become professors than men, and that gender differences in promotion rates have not 
decreased in time. Heijstra and colleagues (2015) show that the gender gap at the 
professoriate level in Iceland is partly explained by years of work experience, but not by 
family-related factors (marital status and number of children) as some literature would 
suggest. These two studies are remarkable since Sweden and Iceland have top positions in the 
Global Gender Gap Report. However, the two studies do not consider variables related to 
productivity. Productivity is considered by Weisshaar (2017): the author conducted a study 
across a sample of academics in Computer Science, English and Sociology in the US, and 
shows that neither productivity, nor organisational characteristics (department size, ranking, 
number of women faculty) explain the gender gap in tenure.  
Van den Brink and Benschop (2014) try to dig in-depth into the processes that hinder women 
to be promoted to professor in the Netherlands. They show the relevance of networks along 
recruitment processes: they highlight the existence of practices called “mobilising 
masculinities”, in which men in senior positions act as gatekeepers and engage in different 
micro-processes to favour other men. Because men academics are still the ones who, in most 
of the cases, cover the positions of power, it might be more difficult for women to enter a 
network having the power to promote them. When it comes to support more junior academics, 
men tend to support other men: the authors explain this phenomenon through the concept of 
homophily, i.e. the perceived similarity among the members of a network. The same has been 
observed by Fletcher et al. (2007) in the UK. This has been defined as the “cloning 
phenomenon” (Johnson, 2007) as well, and it is negatively impacting on the achievement of 
diversity at the top of the academic hierarchies.  
To address the gendering of promotion criteria, universities often try to form gender-balanced 
appointment committees, because this seems to create a more favourable environment for 
women. Van den Brink, Benschop and Jansen (2010) find that gender-balanced committees 
tend to appoint more women; however, along the recruitment process, the concept of 
excellence is more often applied to men candidates, and without any substantial ground. The 
authors highlight that the lack of a clear definition of “excellence” and “merit” leaves the 
terrain open to gender micro-politics disadvantaging women.  
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Gender dynamics in the Italian ASN system 
Research focused on gender differences in promotion processes in Italy presents mixed 
findings. Abramo et al. (2016) analyse the 2008 competition for associate professors, finding 
no gender difference in relation to positive bias (i.e. favouritism), whereas there is a 
discrimination against highly performing men. However, a previous study shows that the 
gender of the president of the evaluating committee has an impact: overall, women in 
committees are more inclined to evaluate according to pure merit in comparison to men in the 
same function (Abramo et al., 2015b). Importantly, the authors found differences among 
disciplines: in the hard sciences, there is a positive association between having a woman as 
the president of the committee, as well as having more women among the successful 
applicants. In addition, women presidents tend to favour applicants who have been their co-
authors, while men tend to favour applicants who have spent many years in their same 
university; the latter finding is confirmed by Abramo, D’Angelo, and Rosati (2015a); it could 
be inferred that the concept of homophily plays a role in this process. De Paola and Scoppa 
(2015) focus on chemistry and economics, and show that a mixed-gender committee helps, 
while women are likely to be less promoted when the committee is composed exclusively by 
men. This conclusion echoes van den Brink and colleagues’ (2010) study on professorial 
appointments in the Netherlands cited above. 
A recent study by Bagues, Sylos-Labini, and Zinovyeva (2017) on the first round of the ASN 
(2012-2014) shows that having women in the selection committee does not favour women’s 
applicants and women’s promotion rates do not increase: having women in the committee 
means that men evaluators become more severe towards women’s applicants. They calculated 
that each additional woman evaluator in the committee decreases by 2% the chance of 
women applicants to be promoted at parity of scientific productivity. They propose two 
possible explanations: a backlash effect, i.e. men co-opt and become more severe towards 
women because they feel their role is threatened; a licensing effect, i.e. men do not feel 
responsible anymore of ensuring equal opportunities and unconsciously do not engage in a 
fair evaluation because of the presence of a woman in the committee.  
Evidence suggests that women tend to be less productive (Abramo, D’Angelo, & Caprasecca, 
2009a, 2009b). Nevertheless, the gap becomes smaller with career progression. Differences 
are also less pronounced when criteria like impact factor are considered. In some disciplines 
(such as physical and chemical sciences), women full professors tend to outperform men. 
However, women are less likely than men to maintain the status of top performers (Abramo 
et al., 2017). Overall, literature shows that gender plays a role in the promotion process: even 
if women tend to be less productive, the evidence provided by Bagues and colleagues (2017) 
shows that women might be discriminated independently of their productivity.  
Looking at aggregated and stock data about the number of full professors in Italy, it is evident 
that there is a progression in the representation of women. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the evolution of the proportion of women professors, for each of the 14 disciplinary areas of 
the ASN: between 2012 and 2016, a slight increase occurred across all the disciplines. 
However, this increase is not necessarily a sign that the system is changing towards a fairer 
promotion procedure in terms of gender equality. Other contextual factors might influence 
that: for instance, the increase could represent only a small proportion of the women that 
deserved a promotion in comparison to men. In fact, when we look at how many achieved a 
promotion among the ones who got the ASN, it seems that women are left behind. Table 2 
shows that in the ASN process there is a substantial gender balance (despite the literature 
above found instances of discrimination). However, when we look at promotions to full 
professor, much more men than women were promoted, across all disciplinary areas. We will 
focus on this point and try to understand if such a difference is justified by scientific 
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production, which is considered to represent the main promotion criterion (data available 
about other possible individual credits, such as managerial duties, are not available). We are 
considering also further confounding variables as next section illustrates. 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Research question, variables and methods 
This paper aims to understand if there is any gender discrimination in the path to obtain a full 
professor position in Italian universities by focusing on the promotion process once 
candidates have achieved the ASN. The time period to be considered when analysing the 
number of promotions to full professor goes from 2013, when the first outcomes of the first 
wave of the new ASN system have been released, to 2016 (4 years of observations). It is 
worth noting that some committees took more months to release the outcome, this meaning 
that scholars who participated in ASN in 2012 might have obtained it in 2014, and 
consequently obtained a promotion to full professor only later on. 
Starting from the data presented in Tables 1 and 2, we are aware that, despite the general 
increase in the number of women full professors, a remarkable gender gap exists when 
looking more closely at the proportion of candidates getting a promotion after achieving the 
ASN. Drawing on the literature commented beforehand, we aim at understanding if a 
discrimination based on gender occurred in this process. The research question states as 
follows:  
RQ: Is there any significant gender difference in the selection of promotion to full professor 
that cannot be explained by scientific productivity?  
To proceed with this analysis, it is important not only to check by productivity indicators and 
by some other variables (summarised in Table 3), but, in addition, to approach data 
considering the structure of the academic system and its promotion procedure. For the latter 
purpose, a multilevel analysis is adopted, this to consider the institutional level where the 
promotions are decided. The justification of the choice of the institutional multilevel analysis 
is supported by the institutional autonomy introduced by the last reform, which makes the 
situation by institution not directly comparable and easy to be collected or observed.  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
Variables 
Prom_or1316. This dummy variable is the dependent variable which refers to the ones who 
got the promotion (“1”) and those who did not (“0”) albeit having obtained the ASN. The 
total number of observations displayed in table 3 is 9714 instead of the lower number (8826) 
that can be derived from Table 2 (totals of “b”, all the people who got the ASN for the rank 
of full professor). This happens because promoted staff since 2013 until 2016 includes all 
academics who became full professor along these four years, included those academics who 
became full professor pursuant the precedent system. These latter observations are 
automatically dropped as for them there is not any information about indicators of scientific 
productivity from ASN source. The lower limit of 2013 was chosen to be sure to include 
eventual early promotions after the first publications of results of ASN 2012 wave. 
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Indicators of scientific productivity. For both bibliometric (from area 1 to area 9 in Table 1) 
and non-bibliometric disciplines (from area 10 to area 14 in Table 1
1
), three indicators have 
been collected by candidates to ASN. These data are retained into the dataset as they 
represent some measure of scientific productivity at the moment of application. These three 
indicators are: “ind1”, number of articles and number of books respectively for bibliometric 
and non-bibliometric disciplines; “ind2”, number of citations and number of both articles and 
chapters in books; “ind3”, H-index and number of articles in “A Class” Journals. In 
comparison to many other studies based on international repositories, this source has the 
advantage to include all the disciplines with some normalisation. These indicators are by the 
way imperfect, as they do not take into account the fractioning nested in the very concept of 
productivity (Abramo & D’Angelo, 2014). As table 3 shows, the total valid observations are 
less than 8000. These three indicators have been all normalised by the respective “thresholds” 
(“mediane” in Italian parlance) stipulated for the achievement of the ASN: according to each 
disciplinary field (SC), all the three indicators might have a specific value to be equalised or 
overcome. Although not being compulsory to be achieved for the sake of obtaining ASN, 
these thresholds serve as a referral by disciplinary field. For example, two persons with the 
same H-index might have a slightly different productivity if they belong to different 
communities with different averages of H-index by age. Consequently, normalising the three 
productivity indicators is essential to make epistemic communities comparable. Computing 
the difference between one’s value and this threshold over the threshold itself, gives a 
normalised number whose range is -1 and ∞. The minimum refers to a null value for that 
indicator, or indicator being equal to 0; 0 means to stay perfectly on the threshold target. Any 
above value indicates the number of times the candidate is above the threshold for his/her SC. 
Considering the number of candidates to the full professor rank obtaining the ASN, and at the 
same time those who were already employees in the Italian academic system, we totalise 
almost 8000 observations (see Table 3). For ind3 a lower number of observations is explained 
by the lack of “A Class” journals indicators in Law SCs. These observations have been 
recovered computing the average score of the first two indicators by each observation. 
Overall, the missing values from the first two waves of ASN is below 5%.  
Age refers to age at the time of application to ASN2012 or ASN2013 and is derived by the 
public profiles uploaded to the ASN website. Age is kept constant in order to have a 
reasonable proxy of the years of activity in accruing publications or citations. The average is 
48, with a standard deviation of almost 7 (Table 3).  
Gender has already been discussed in Table 2. In Table 3 and 4, “1” means men; “2” women.  
Punti organico (PO). PO is a checking variable that is set at the institutional level. It refers to 
punti organico, which is an annually value released by the Minister for each Italian university 
on the basis of both size of institutions and institutional performance-based indicators. This 
value is basically a measure for budgeting the promotions or new personnel to be recruited. 
The number of PO indicates how much money can be spent for the recruitment of assistant 
professors and/or promotion/recruitment of associate professors and/or 
promotion/recruitment of full professors. The choice to spend these POs for any combination 
of these ranks is up to the institutions. In the Italian system the majority of progressions are 
promotions within the same university once a person becomes a permanent employee in a 
certain university. The value adopted is the sum by institutions of the PO published from the 
year 2013 until 2016 (both included), normalised by the average number of associate 
professors in years 2014 and 2016, when promotions occurred. This normalised value hence 
                                                          
1 Some disciplines in “area 10” are bibliometric such as some in “area 8” are not bibliometric. This detail has no 
great relevance as some normalisation has been pursued.  
The Trench Warfare of Gender Discrimination 
8 
is able to represent the probability to get promoted by institutions as it measures the 
theoretical fractions of available slots in the institution. This measure is unweighted by merit 
of individuals, as it is not linked to individual indicators of performance. There are no 
missing values for this variable.  
VQR_2010. VQR is the normalised score by department in the research evaluation exercise 
“VQR 2004-2010” released by ANVUR Agency. For each observation, there is the 
associated score of the candidate’s department, which informs about the quality of the 
department of affiliation at the time of application to ASN. According to literature, other 
factors being equal, people coming from a better department could be able to obtain the 
promotion on the basis of the prestige derived by the affiliation (Burris, 2004). This variable 
does not necessarily represent the score of the department at the current moment of possible 
promotion. In fact, along 2013 and 2016 many persons might have changed department 
affiliation because of the implementation of Gelmini Law (210/2010), which imposed 
merging and establishment of new departments (respecting the minimum size of 40 members 
by department). In fact, this variable represents the national score of quality of the “origin” 
affiliation of each person, assuming as scarce the probability of mobility for personnel who 
look after promotion to full professor. According to Table 3, this variable let pay a small 
price in terms of missing values. It is to be considered that other studies highlight some 
relevant limitations of this research exercise in pretending to accurately and scientifically 
measure the quality of a Department (Abramo, Cicero, & D’Angelo, 2013; Abramo & 
D'Angelo, 2015b; Abramo, D’Angelo, & Viel, 2010; Abramo & D’Angelo, 2016; 
Franceschini & Maisano, 2017). Part of these limitations might be caused by political 
constraints (i.e. option to include peer review instead of just secondary data). Nevertheless, 
we include this variable, and the following one, on the ground that it is possible to 
hypothesize that the better the outcome of a department within each university, the more the 
chances to acquire the limited resources of PO, winning the game of competition for (usually 
scarce) slots of promotions. In this way, it is possible to control if promotions can be 
predicted by this official, though imperfect, measure of quality of research at department 
level.   
VQR_2014. This variable is the analogous to the previous one, but refers to the following 
research evaluation exercise which covered the period from 2011 to 2014 (both years 
included). This control variable is interesting as it describes the recipient department, or 
“destination” affiliation. Although the evaluation exercise is limited until 2014, basically they 
cover the newly established Departments and hence substantially it measures a possible 
relative strength of different disciplines within a same university. This variable is constructed 
on data released on 22
nd
 of February 2017 and it causes around one thousand missing values. 
Missing values are more likely to happen for those Departments that are small in numbers 
and for which VQR caused the most forceful national public criticism.   
Position. Position refers to the rank-and-file position of the person at the moment of 
application to ASN 2012 or 2013. In this case, the list of the ranks is sorted by its hierarchy. 
Considering the promotions to full professors, the main part of the set of people with the 
ASN who concretely could achieve the promotions are those under the different categories of 
“associate professors”. “Confermato” and “non confermato” (respectively “confirmed” and 
“not confirmed”) refer to a sort of senior and junior ranks respectively (formally this may be 
considered also a sort of probation), for which seniority is more important than productivity. 
This variable makes lose some observations, especially for those cases where the numbers of 
scholars with an ASN obtained in a lower rank are few.  
Findings  
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Table 2 shows that the proportion of men being promoted to full professor is slightly higher 
in all the disciplinary areas. Among all the men who obtained the ASN, 19% was promoted to 
full professor, while 15% of the women was promoted. This means that in comparison, less 
women than men (among all the women and all the men who have the ASN) could become 
full professor. This is especially striking in areas such as earth sciences (17% of the men 
becoming full professor, against 7% of the women), chemistry (19% of men against 12% of 
women), and law (29% of men against 24% of women). In general, there is not a single 
discipline in which the proportion of women being promoted equals or outnumbers those of 
men.  
Factors affecting promotion 
As mentioned above, the gender gap in promotion to full professor might be due to other 
factors, such as scientific production or the number of available positions. Table 4 reports the 
results from a logistic regression. The missing values from the real number showed in table 2 
are a derivation of what showed in table 3 plus the restrictions due to a certain number of 
small institutions. Among all the three indicators of scientific productivity, ind2 (the number 
of citations for bibliometric disciplines and number of both articles and chapters in books for 
non-bibliometric disciplines) does not play a role. The other two variables, ind1 (the number 
of articles for bibliometric disciplines, and books for non-bibliometric disciplines), and ind3 
(H-index for bibliometric disciplines and number of articles in “A Class” Journals for non-
bibliometric disciplines) are good predictors in individuating those who achieve the 
promotion. This is not surprising since, for bibliometric disciplines, number of articles and H-
index are a more robust signs of productivity than the number of citations, while, for non-
bibliometric disciplines, the number of articles in “top journals” is especially important. PO, 
the value referring to the amount of resources annually available to each institution to recruit 
or promote academic staff, has not any impact. Age has an impact (at the disadvantage of 
older candidates). Gender shows to have the strongest coefficient, which clearly demonstrate 
that at parity of scientific productivity, men are more likely to get the promotion to full 
professors if compared to women in similar conditions of academic productivity. Considering 
the model presented in Table 4
2
, it can be stated that gender, along with two out of three 
indicators of productivity, are able to predict the promotion to full professor. In addition, the 
ordinal variable of “position” indicates that seniority based on rank-and-file plays an 
important role in the decision to bestow a promotion to the highest rank. Both the quality of 
“origin” and “destination” department are not associated with the promotion. In particular, 
the coefficients explain that gender only is the strongest predictor. In other words, keeping 
productivity constant and controlling by the theoretical available slots for promotions (PO), 
women have around 24% less probability to get promoted. This analysis checks also by the 
level of institution, where different sort of procedures can occur (e.g. with or without a public 
call or competition) or passing through institutional bodies whose gender composition is hard 
to be retrieved. Other relevant factors such as same affiliation between committee members 
and candidate or also kinships cannot be observed, although literature about the Italian 
academic system shows to be relevant to understand how competitions do not respect the 
meritocracy principle (Abramo & D’Angelo, 2015).  
 
Table 4 around here 
 
                                                          
2
 At the current stage, we omit variable VQR_14 as it would lose around 1000 observations. Running the same 
analysis with this variable does not change the main findings.  
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The findings echo Danell and Hjerm’s (2013) contribution about the presence of a gender gap 
in academic promotions in Sweden, and they are especially remarkable since we controlled 
for scientific productivity. Moreover, despite the different epistemological positioning, the 
presence of an unjustified gender discrimination in the promotion to full professor provides 
further grounding to the studies by van den Brink and colleagues (2014; 2010). Finally, the 
quality of the candidate’s department of origin (VQR_2010) does not have an impact on the 
promotion process to full professor, although existing literature shows the opposite (Burris, 
2004). This latter point can be probably explained by differences between the US and the 
Italian contexts. 
Discussion 
This paper provides a notable contribution when considered together with previous studies 
looking at the achievement of ASN (M. Bagues et al., 2017; Marini, 2016; Marzolla, 2016): it 
is paramount to shed light on what happens in the career trajectories of those scholars 
achieving the ASN, since successfully going through the ASN does not mean to get a position. 
Findings on the contrary show that a gender gap exists in accessing a position as full 
professor in Italy, and this cannot be explained by scientific productivity; this is remarkable 
since our analysis considers the entire population and all disciplines. 
Two points are especially worth of attention. First, the discrimination based on gender is 
transversal, since discrimination can be found across different disciplinary areas and 
universities. This means that discrimination happens independently of disciplinary or 
institutional contexts. Second, the phenomenon is persistent. Where more transparency is 
present (the ASN), discriminations exist (according to previous literature), but are more 
marginal. However, the presence of a transparent process does not erase discriminations 
completely. It seems that discriminations are always laying on the background of a process, 
and emerge at other points of the process itself, or through different practices. These two 
points may help to understand that fact that ASN was substantially equal because at that stage 
concrete resources were not yet at stake whereas when to ensure real resources is at stake 
(promotions), discrimination resurfaces quite predominantly.  
Regarding the transversal nature of the phenomenon, there are three factors that might have 
an influence in an environment where women full professors still represent a minority: 
networking, homophily, and, more generally, unconscious gender bias. The exclusion of 
women from important networks, as analysed by van den Brink and Beschop (2014), might 
apply in this case as well. Scholars at full professor level, mostly men, might be in charge for 
years at the same institution, this meaning that networks among professors might be quite 
strong. Especially in an academic system like the Italian one, that has been classified as 
oligarchic (Clark, 1998) or dominated by the academic oligarchy (Clark 1983), networks are 
paramount to become a full professor, and it is very likely that these networks are based on 
homophily. To this regard, it is also interesting to consider our findings about the impact of 
the quality of one’s own department (VQR). This does not play a role in the promotion 
process: the “official quality” of the department and its associated prestige are not usually 
among the main criteria when the consumption of resources (“PO”) is at stake at institutional 
level. Following the literature stating that VQR is not accurate enough, we cannot state 
whether academics would like to allocate promotions on the base of some reliable research 
evaluation results but they cannot, or if at institutional levels other factors may play a major 
role. Further investigation about the role of networks as a source of bargaining power would 
be helpful.  
Homophily is another issue deserving further attention, since it might play a role in the final 
decision-making process. We might hypothesise that, being promotion committees (or 
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however the set of peers at full professor rank who might be entitled to take decisions about 
promotions) more likely to be composed of men, they might privilege other men only 
because the committee’s members (or the decision takers in question) better identify 
themselves with men. This important question would require further investigation. 
Homophily might become especially strong when associated to a broader gender bias: gender 
bias might operate even in presence of facts and data explicitly dismantling this belief (Van 
den Brink et al., 2010). This might also be the case in our study: achievements of the 
candidates in terms of scientific productivity are publicly available in the case of the ASN, 
but still women might be reputed to miss some milestones in their CVs. 
In relation to the persistency of the phenomenon, the fact that actual promotions are left to the 
individual universities is limiting the potential beneficial effects that a transparent process, 
such as the ASN, might have in terms of ensuring more equality and meritocracy. Literature 
stresses that transparency in recruitment and promotion procedures is a key for avoiding 
biases and ensuring equality (Ledwith & Manfredi, 2000; Roos & Gatta, 2009; van den Brink 
& Benschop, 2012b; Van den Brink et al., 2010). The introduction of ASN as a transparent 
process helped; however, this process represents only the initial step in the path towards 
promotion, and it still leaves an opaque system in place at institutional level. Furthermore, it 
seems that the introduction of a transparent process has not any knock-on effect in raising 
awareness or making promotion decisions more engaged towards merit or equality, at least 
not going beyond the very specific evaluation in question. In this case, evidence tells there is 
less gender discrimination at ASN level, and substantially more gender discrimination at the 
promotion level.  
Additionally, our study is interesting in front of the debate on the gender pay gap in academia 
(Umbach, 2007): being women relegated to the lowest positions inside academia, they will 
not be able to access the highest salary scales, as the Italian system does not include pay 
increase according to productivity. This shows how different types of disadvantages affect 
women’s careers, and make discriminations more difficult to tackle. Actually, inequalities 
might become more persistent when more disadvantages cumulate. This issue relates to the 
broader topic of how committed an entire higher education system is in promoting diversity. 
The fact that gender discriminations are transversal and persistent is at the base of our 
contribution. These two points underline that gender inequality is strongly rooted in the 
higher education sector – this echoing an older contribution from Bagilhole and Goode (2001) 
about the existence of a patriarchal system in academic careers. The second is upon the more 
general argument that organisations are structured around inequality regimes at the 
disadvantage of specific gender, class, and ethnicity groups (J. Acker, 2006). We especially 
stress the persistency, meaning that discriminations in a system tend to survive, taking new 
forms, inhabiting new practices, or getting even more rooted in old practices.  
Our findings have implications for policy as well. When going through the more recent data 
provided by She Figures 2015 (EC, 2016), Italy is below the European average concerning 
the adoption of gender equality plans, and specifically in relation to the measures for 
supporting career development and ensuring appropriate representation of women in 
recruitment committees. The introduction of gender equality plans has been advocated at the 
European level as a strategy aiming at a structural change of science, this being necessary to 
make research institutions more oriented toward gender equality (EC, 2012). Although the 
data reported in She Figures show that gender equality plans might not be enough, because a 
change at both institutional and individual level is necessary, equality plans represent an 
important step to raise awareness and call for more transparency. This case about Italy shows 
clearly that whenever transparency is missing, specific equality policies are sparse, and the 
general culture is not sensitive to gender equality, the overall situation in terms of gender 
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discriminations is worrying. In addition, the general scarcity of resources is not helping the 
path towards equality. The overall policy message hence informs that an imperfect and slow 
process, such as the ASN, achieves nevertheless equality targets more effectively in 
comparison to contexts where these policies are not put in place and transparency is missing.  
Conclusion  
This study shows that between 2013 and 2016, when a new institutional system of 
promotions entered in place in all its phases, women concurring to the rank of full professors 
suffered discrimination not explained by poorer scientific productivity. We could only try to 
infer the reasons of this discrimination – this is terrain for future research – but it is 
remarkable how it emerges across discipline and institutions and how different it is from 
transparent awarding fit-for-the-role step.  
As the title of this paper shows, we are confronted to a situation that resembles that of trench 
warfare in the First World War: gaining a few steps of terrain (a small increase in the number 
of women in full professor rank) does not change the overall pattern and does not imply a 
victory (discriminations are still there). Our metaphor also refers to the evidence that small 
“aggregated gain” (the increments in the percentage of women in the higher rank showed in 
table 2) comes at a high cost in terms of “lives” (the women who did not get the promotion 
although having the same requisites in productivity of many men who got it). Nevertheless, 
some caveat are to be mentioned. First, the measures of productivity might be improved, 
connecting candidates to their Web of Science (or Scopus) indicators, especially for 
bibliometric disciplines. Second, being the mechanisms of promotions at institutional level 
some sort of black boxes, we maintain that future research could aim at understanding which 
actual patterns may cause the discrimination found in this research. It is possible that 
seniority in the school or department, but also affiliation in streams of research played a 
major role, being all these factors that are not necessarily linked to gender in one way or 
another. Kinship also ought to be checked. These analyses cannot enter this study because the 
names of the committees’ members at institutional level are not known. 
This finding calls not only for more research to further understand on which base this 
discrimination is built and how it happens, but, also, it calls for dedicated adoptions of gender 
equality policies, or at least more transparency, to bridge a gap that is not going to solve by 
itself. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Proportion of women at the full professor level, evolution 2012 - 2016 
 
2012 2016 
 
Disciplinary areas 
tot full 
professors 
% 
Women 
tot full 
professors 
% 
Women 
Marginal increase 
of women in full 
professor rank 
A1 Mathematics and Informatics 833 18.0 799 19.1 6.3 
A2 Physics 471 9.8 475 11.2 14.2 
A3 Chemistry 563 19.2 534 22.8 19.1 
A4 Earth Sciences 202 16.8 192 17.7 5.2 
A5 Biology 1,037 29.7 931 32.2 8.5 
A6 Medicine 1,831 12.8 1,811 14.6 14.0 
A7 Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences 691 16.4 675 17.5 6.9 
A8 Civil Engineering and Architecture 800 15.1 724 18.2 20.5 
A9 Industrial Engineering and Information Systems 1,358 6.6 1,406 8.7 33.5 
A10 Classical Studies, Philology, Arts and Literature 1,204 41.3 1,041 42.1 1.9 
A11 History, Philosophy and Psychology 1,148 30.6 1,063 34.8 13.8 
A12 Law 1,388 20.6 1,429 23.0 11.4 
A13 Economics and Statistics 1,351 19.8 1,383 22.1 11.5 
A14 Political and Social Sciences 365 24.1 336 26.2 8.6 
Total  13,242 20.3 12,799 22.1 8.6 
Source: MIUR Ministry and ASN repository 
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Table 2: ASN and promotion by gender and disciplinary area, absolute numbers and percentages (italic) 
  
ASN Promotions 
  
M F M F 
 Disciplinary areas a b c a b c d e d e 
A1 Mathematics and Informatics 725 309 42.6 261 111 42.5 63 20.4 18 16.2 
A2 Physics 1,063 635 59.7 255 154 60.4 68 10.7 11 7.1 
A3 Chemistry 430 253 58.8 249 163 65.5 49 19.4 19 11.7 
A4 Earth Sciences 327 141 43.1 98 30 30.6 24 17.0 2 6.7 
A5 Biology 821 449 54.7 591 270 45.7 72 16.0 33 12.2 
A6 Medicine 2,427 1,185 48.8 735 318 43.3 219 18.5 48 15.1 
A7 Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences 513 324 63.2 237 138 58.2 58 17.9 22 15.9 
A8 Civil Engineering and Architecture 801 323 40.3 310 116 37.4 75 23.2 22 19.0 
A9 Industrial Engineering and Information Systems 1,338 690 51.6 282 138 48.9 153 22.2 27 19.6 
A10 Classical Studies, Philology, Arts and Literature 961 484 50.4 1,010 525 52.0 78 16.1 63 12.0 
A11 History, Philosophy and Psychology 920 355 38.6 571 261 45.7 66 18.6 48 18.4 
A12 Law 688 299 43.5 326 165 50.6 86 28.8 39 23.6 
A13 Economics and Statistics 911 532 58.4 457 247 54.0 114 21.4 47 19.0 
A14 Political and Social Sciences 331 138 41.7 164 73 44.5 36 26.1 16 21.9 
Total   12,256 6,117 49.9 5,546 2,709 48.9 1,161 19.0 415 15.3 
Legend:  
a) Number of applicants 
b) Number of winners 
c) Percentage of success (b/a [%]) 
d) Number of promoted  
e) Percentage of promoted (d/b [%]) 
Source: MIUR Ministry and ASN repository 
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Table 3: Summary of variables to predict promotion to full professor 
VARIABLE OBS. MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
PROM_OR1316 9,714 .2536545 .4351246 0 1 
IND1 7,678 .9058766 1.670424 -1 53.76577 
IND2 7,935 1.819094 5.917959 -1 178.8 
IND3 7,584 .8518571 2.171892 -1 43.44 
AGE 8,778 48.45033 6.979624 28 70 
SEX 9,714 1.3042 .4600915 1 2 
VQR_R (2010) 7,656 1.084919 .3499847 -.44 2.83 
VQR_R (2014) 6,415 1.083772 .2621625 0 2.97 
PO 9,714 .1300439 .2742291 0 7.986667 
POSITION:      
  0 NOT EMPLOYEES (1) 1,590     
  1 FIXED TERM R10 18     
  2 FIXED TERM R05 24     
  3 RESEARCHER NOT CONF 88     
  4 RESEARCHER 1,112     
  5 ASSOCIATE NOT CONF 856     
  6 ASSOCIATE CONF 4,771     
  7 ASSOCIATE 172     
  TOTAL (“0” NOT INCLUDED) 7,041     
(1) These scholars do not enter the analysis 
Source: MIUR Ministry, ASN and ANVUR repositories 
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Table 4: Multilevel logistic regression at institutional level to predict promotion to full professor  
Mixed-effects GLM                               Number of obs     =      5,903 
Family:                 ordinal 
Link:                     logit 
Group variable:          ateneo                 Number of groups  =         82 
 
                                                Obs per group: 
                                                              min =          1 
                                                              avg =       72.0 
                                                              max =        390 
 
Integration method: mvaghermite                 Integration pts.  =          7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(13)     =     308.63 
Log likelihood = -2746.2767                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          prom_or1316 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
               ind1_I |   .0922759   .0226209     4.08   0.000     .0479398     .136612 
               ind2_I |  -.0030649   .0070215    -0.44   0.662    -.0168267    .0106969 
               ind3_I |   .0509832   .0176204     2.89   0.004     .0164479    .0855185 
                   PO |   .0728028   .1823269     0.40   0.690    -.2845514     .430157 
                  sex |  -.3489822   .0801067    -4.36   0.000    -.5059884    -.191976 
                  age |  -.0450636   .0061254    -7.36   0.000    -.0570692   -.0330581 
                      | 
             position | 
      fixed term r10  |  -18.71327   3271.707    -0.01   0.995     -6431.14    6393.714 
      fixed term r05  |  -19.26216   7038.527    -0.00   0.998    -13814.52       13776 
 researcher not conf  |  -2.595677   .5355862    -4.85   0.000    -3.645407   -1.545948 
          researcher  |  -2.490001   .1684825   -14.78   0.000    -2.820221   -2.159781 
  associate not conf  |  -.5661263   .1157997    -4.89   0.000    -.7930897    -.339163 
           associate  |   -.745418    .259752    -2.87   0.004    -1.254523   -.2363134 
                      | 
                vqr_r |  -.0251122   .1205649    -0.21   0.835    -.2614152    .2111907 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                /cut1 |  -1.478513   .3686905    -4.01   0.000    -2.201133   -.7558925 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ateneo                | 
            var(_cons)|   .8635369   .2192591                      .5249934    1.420391 
----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ateneo>bib_Ateneo     | 
            var(_cons)|    .089024   .0565129                      .0256543    .3089259 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test vs. ologit model: chi2(2) = 313.36                Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Source: MIUR Ministry, ASN and ANVUR repositories 
